Russian and English Emotional Concepts[1]
Ðóññêèå è àíãëèéñêèå
ýìîöèîíàëüíûå êîíöåïòû
Apresjan
V.Ju.
(valentina.apresjan@gmail.com), Institute of Russian Language,
 ñîâðåìåííîé ýòíîëèíãâèñòèêå
îäíîé èç öåíòðàëüíûõ ÿâëÿåòñÿ ìûñëü î òîì, ÷òî ðàçëè÷èÿ â ÿçûêå îòðàæàþò
ðàçëè÷èÿ â íàöèîíàëüíîé ìåíòàëüíîñòè. Ñîîòâåòñòâåííî, îñíîâíàÿ ìàññà
ñîâðåìåííûõ ýòíîëèíãâèñòè÷åñêèõ ðàáîò, â òîì ÷èñëå íà ðóññêîì ìàòåðèàëå,
ñîñðåäîòî÷åíà íà ïîèñêå òàêèõ ðàçëè÷èé è, â ÷àñòíîñòè, íà ñðàâíåíèè «êëþ÷åâûõ
ñëîâ» ðàçíûõ ÿçûêîâ (ïîíÿòèå, ââåäåííîå À. Âåæáèöêîé) – ñëîâ, êîòîðûå ÿâëÿþòñÿ
îñîáåííî âàæíûìè âûðàçèòåëÿìè ãëàâíûõ ìåíòàëüíûõ îñîáåííîñòåé íîñèòåëåé òîãî
èëè èíîãî ÿçûêà (êëàññè÷åñêèå ïðèìåðû À. Âåæáèöêîé – ýòî äóøà, òîñêà, ñóäüáà).
Ïðèçíàâàÿ âñþ öåííîñòü ýòîãî
ïîäõîäà, â íàñòîÿùåé ðàáîòå ìû õîòåëè áû, ñîñðåäîòî÷èòüñÿ íå òîëüêî íà
êîíöåïòóàëüíûõ ðàçëè÷èÿõ, íî è íà ñõîäñòâàõ ìåæäó ÿçûêàìè. Ðàáîòà âûïîëíåíà íà
ìàòåðèàëå ýìîöèîíàëüíûõ êîíöåïòîâ â ðóññêîì è àíãëèéñêîì ÿçûêàõ. Íàðÿäó ñ
èñïîëüçîâàíèåì ñòàâøèõ êëàññè÷åñêèìè ïîäõîäîâ ê îïèñàíèþ ýìîöèé â ÿçûêå –
ïðîòîòèïè÷åñêîãî ïîäõîäà Ë.Èîðäàíñêîé è À.Âåæáèöêîé, ïðèíÿòîãî Ìîñêîâñêîé
ñåìàíòè÷åñêîé øêîëîé, à òàêæå ìåòàôîðè÷åñêîãî ïîäõîäà Äæ.Ëàêîâà è Ç.Êåâå÷åñà,
ïîëîæèâøèõ íà÷àëî êîãíèòèâèñòñêîé øêîëå, äàííàÿ ðàáîòà ïðåäëàãàåò íå÷òî íîâîå.
Öåëüþ ÿâëÿåòñÿ íå ñðàâíåíèå îòäåëüíûõ ñëîâ èëè êîíöåïòîâ, à ñðàâíåíèå öåëûõ
êîíöåïòóàëüíûõ ïîëåé è ïîñòðîåíèå øèðîêèõ ñåìàíòè÷åñêèõ òèïîëîãèé. Ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ 11 ãðóïï (èëè êëàñòåðîâ)
ýìîöèé – ‘ñòðàõ’, ‘ãíåâ’, ‘îòâðàùåíèå’, ‘ãðóñòü’, ‘ðàäîñòü’, ‘ñòûä’, ‘æàëîñòü’,
‘îáèäà’, ‘’, ‘ãîðäîñòü’, ‘ðåâíîñòü/çàâèñòü’, ‘áëàãîäàðíîñòü’. Â êàæäîé ãðóïïå
àíàëèçèðóåòñÿ îñíîâíàÿ ìàññà ëèíãâèñòè÷åñêèõ ñðåäñòâ, âûðàæàþùèõ ðàçíûå ñòîðîíû
ýìîöèè – âî-ïåðâûõ, âåñü ñïåêòð ñèíîíèìîâ â ðàçíûõ ÷àñòÿõ ðå÷è, ïðåäñòàâëÿþùèõ
ðàçíûå òèïû è îòòåíêè ýìîöèè (íàïðèìåð, äëÿ êëàñòåðà ‘ÑÒÐÀÕ’ - áîÿòüñÿ,
ïóãàòüñÿ, òðóñèòü, ñòðàøèòüñÿ, îïàñàòüñÿ, ñòðàõ, áîÿçíü è ïð. äëÿ ðóññêîãî;
to be afraid, to be scared, to fear, fear, dread è ïð.
äëÿ àíãëèéñêîãî); âî-âòîðûõ, âåñü ñïåêòð ÷àñòåðå÷íî ðàçíîðîäíûõ ñðåäñòâ,
ïðåäñòàâëÿþùèõ ðàçíûå àñïåêòû ýìîöèè – êàóçàöèþ (ïóãàòü, ñòðàøíûé), ýìîöèîíàëüíîå ñîñòîÿíèå (ãðóñòíî, ñòðàøíî), ïîâåäåíèå, ìîòèâèðîâàííîå ýìîöèåé (óæàñàòüñÿ, æàëåòü), ôèçèîëîãè÷åñêèå
ðåàêöèè íà ýìîöèþ (ïîáåëåòü, ïîáàãðîâåòü,
ïîõîëîäåòü); ïîâåäåí÷åñêèå ðåàêöèè íà ýìîöèþ (óáåæàòü â óæàñå, óäàðèòü êóëàêîì ïî ñòîëó îò äîñàäû).
Ïðîàíàëèçèðîâàííûé ìàòåðèàë äàåò âîçìîæíîñòü óñòàíîâèòü êàê ñõîäñòâà, òàê è
ðàçëè÷èÿ â êîíöåïòóàëèçàöèè ýìîöèé â ðóññêîì è àíãëèéñêîì ÿçûêàõ, à òàêæå â
ñåìàíòè÷åñêîì óñòðîéñòâå ýòèõ ïîëåé. Îáíàðóæèâàåòñÿ, ÷òî ïðè áåññïîðíîì íàëè÷èè
ìíîãî÷èñëåííûõ ñåìàíòè÷åñêèõ êîíòðàñòîâ ìåæäó îòäåëüíûìè ñëîâàìè â ðóññêîì è
àíãëèéñêîì, à òàêæå ÷àñòîì îòñóòñòâèè áåçóñëîâíîãî ïåðåâîäíîãî ýêâèâàëåíòà,
óñòðîéñòâî ýìîöèîíàëüíûõ êëàñòåðîâ â öåëîì ó ìíîãèõ ýìîöèé ñèëüíî ïåðåñåêàåòñÿ.
Íàïðèìåð, è ðóññêèé, è àíãëèéñêèé ÿçûêè âûäåëèëè ñëåäóþùèå ïîäâèäû ñòðàõà:
îáùèé, íåéòðàëüíûé ñòðàõ (áîÿòüñÿ, ñòðàõ,
to fear/ to be afraid), êðàòêîâðåìåííûé
áèîëîãè÷åñêèé ñòðàõ (ïóãàòüñÿ, to be scared, to be frightened); ñèëüíûé ñòðàõ ïåðåä
íåïîñðåäñòâåííî óãðîæàþùèì, ìàñøòàáíûì è
íåèçâåñòíûì (óæàñ, terrror); ñèëüíûé ñòðàõ ïåðåä
íåèçáåæíûì è îòäàëåííûì âî âðåìåíè (ñòðàøèòüñÿ,
to dread); ðàöèîíàëüíûé ñòðàõ (îïàñàòüñÿ, to be apprehensive);
áëàãîãîâåéíûé ñòðàõ ïåðåä âûñøèìè ñèëàìè (òðåïåòàòü,
to be awed) è ïð.
Ïðè ýòîì ãðàíèöû ïîäâèäîâ ýìîöèé íå îáÿçàòåëüíî ñîâïàäàþò ñ ëåêñè÷åñêèìè: òàê, to be scared ìîæåò âûðàæàòü è êðàòêîâðåìåííûé “áèîëîãè÷åñêèé” ñòðàõ (I got scared), è íåéòðàëüíûé
ñòðàõ-îòíîøåíèå (I’m scared of dogs). Ïðåäñòàâëÿåòñÿ, ÷òî
ñðàâíåíèå íå îòäåëüíûõ ñëîâ, à öåëûõ ïîëåé ïîçâîëÿåò ñîñòàâèòü áîëåå
îáúåêòèâíîå ïðåäñòàâëåíèå î ÿçûêîâîé êîíöåïòóàëèçàöèè êàêèõ-òî ÿâëåíèé, â òîì
÷èñëå ýìîöèé, è èçáåæàòü íåâåðíîãî îòîæäåñòâëåíèÿ îòñóòñòâèÿ è íàëè÷èÿ â ÿçûêå
êàêèõ-òî ñëîâ – â ÷àñòíîñòè, òî÷íûõ ïåðåâîäíûõ ýêâèâàëåíòîâ ñëîâàì äðóãîãî
ÿçûêà, ñ îòñóòñòâèåì è íàëè÷èåì êàêèõ-òî ìåíòàëüíûõ, êîãíèòèâíûõ è
ýìîöèîíàëüíûõ îñîáåííîñòåé ó íîñèòåëåé ýòîãî ÿçûêà.
The idea that languages both reflect and shape their speakers’ mentalities, goes back as far as Humboldt’s work and the famous Sapir and Whorf’s hypothesis. While SWH was empirically and theoretically challenged by the proponents of linguistic innateness and universality, it has seen a comeback in the works of Wierzbicka [Wierzbicka 1990, 1991, 1992, 1999] and the entire NSM school. Though SWH is hardly popular nowadays in its strong version, the weaker claim that language reflects mentality is very much a part of today’s ethnolinguistic discourse. It is strongly featured in Wierzbicka’s line of research, particularly in the notion of key words – “words which are particularly important and revealing in a given culture”, e.g. Russian äóøà ‘soul’, òîñêà ‘yearning’ and ñóäüáà ‘fate’ [Wierzbicka 1990, 1997:15, 55-84].
In the last decade, the search for culture-specific vocabulary, including Russian data, has thrived, and researchers have added a few items to the list of Russian key words, among them àâîñü ‘perhaps with luck’, ñîâåñòü ‘conscience’, æàëîñòü ‘pity’, èñòèíà ‘the Truth, gospel-truth’, äðóã ‘friend’, âîëÿ ‘unrestrained physical freedom’, ñìèðåíèå ‘humility’ [Wierzbicka 1997:55-84, Bulygina & Shmelev 1997:481-495, Levontina & Zalizniak 2001: 306-309], ìàÿòüñÿ ‘to hang about for a long time yearning’, òîìèòüñÿ ‘to yearn, to languish’, íåïðèêàÿííîñòü’ ‘the state of not knowing what to do and where to be, and feeling bad because of that’, ïîçîð ‘disgrace’ [Shmelev 2002:404-410], îáèäà ‘offence, hurt feelings’ [Levontina & Zalizniak 2001: 306-309], ñîáðàòüñÿ ‘to get around to doing something’, çàîäíî ‘along with, while one is at it’ [Shmelev 2002:300, 406-407], and others, which supposedly reflect various aspects of the “Russian soul”.
While the contrastive ethnolinguistic framework has been extremely efficient in dispensing with Anglo-centricity in the description of language, as well as producing vastly impressive empirical results, it has also raised some general methodological questions. It is undeniably true that all cultures are unique and that these peculiarities are to some extent reflected in language. However, it is not entirely clear to what extent language can serve as an objective mirror of culture – in other words, to what extent it is possible to draw inferences about a culture or national mentality based on linguistic facts, such as a presence of a certain untranslatable word in the vocabulary of a language. Direct un-translatability is a regular phenomenon across languages, yet it in itself cannot serve as an indication that speakers of these languages do indeed view the world differently.
The notion of linguistic salience which is fundamental to the contrastive ethnolinguistic framework is not entirely transparent either: the frequency of a word in a language as compared to the frequency of its translation in another language is not necessarily a proof of greater salience of a respective concept, as it is often the case that a concept expressed by one polysemous word or a word with a more general meaning in one language is expressed by several words in another language, as is the case, for example, with the Russian word äóøà ‘lit. soul’, which corresponds to the English soul and heart.
Other linguistic factors that are often considered as an indication of a word’s salience, such as, for example, the number of its derivatives, are not always reliable criteria either, as languages are bound to vary in this respect based on the variation in the richness of their grammatical and lexical systems, irrespectively of how central or marginal the concept in question might be.
This paper proposes
a framework for a semantic typology of emotion concepts in language, which
considers both their similarities and differences. The framework incorporates
the existing linguistic accounts of emotions, i.e. the scenario-based semantic approach
of [Iordanskaja 1972, 1984] and Wierzbicka [1999], also adopted by some
psychologists [cf. Shweder 2004], as well the conceptual metaphor-based
approach of the cognitive semantics [Lakoff & Jonhson, Kövecses 1990,
Emanatian 1995, Kövecses 2000]. The novelty of the proposed approach is in
its scale: rather than comparing individual parts of the system, such as
separate emotion terms, entire systems in the form of “emotion clusters” are juxtaposed.
Each emotion cluster is represented by many “members”, e.g., anger, fury, wrath, irritation, and
other expressions for ‘ANGER’ cluster
in English, whose meanings together form the “conceptual map” of ‘ANGER’ system
in that language. By cross-linguistic “superimposing ” of the conceptual maps
of emotions in different languages, one is able to capture a holistic picture
of the emotional universe, where both the universality and the differences
displayed across languages can be clearly seen. For example, both English and
Russian have explicitly incorporated the following types of ‘ANGER’ in their
conceptual systems: ‘justified’ anger (indignation,
íåãîäîâàíèå), ‘strong uncontrollable anger’ (rage, áåøåíñòâî), ‘mean anger’ (venom, çëîáà), ‘nerve-wrecking anger’ (irritation,
ðàçäðàæåíèå), but English has also a type of
‘helpless disappointed anger’ (frustration),
which Russian lacks.
Cluster
comparison involves comparing multiple emotion terms belonging to different parts of speech and all other
related linguistic items, denoting causation of emotions, emotional behaviors, physiological
manifestations of emotions and other aspects of emotions.
Overall, 11 emotion clusters in English and Russian have been analyzed, including the five emotions considered “basic” in most psychological and physiological studies - ‘FEAR’, ‘ANGER’, ‘SADNESS’, ‘DISGUST’, ‘JOY’ (basic emotions), ‘SHAME’, ‘OFFENCE’, ‘PITY’, ‘PRIDE’, ‘ENVY/JEALOUSY’, ‘GRATITUDE’.
Emotion clusters in English and
Russian: general tendencies.
If one looks at emotion clusters in Russian and English, i.e., at an entire range of emotions within a certain group, one would find a lot of similarity in how the fields are organized logically and conceptually. While the precise linguistic expression can be and is different, a very similar range of emotion gradations is found in the two languages.
Moreover,
emotion metaphors turn out to overlap to a large extent as well, which is
hardly surprising given that a lot of emotion metaphors are biologically rooted
and based on physiologically conditioned responses to various stimuli.
Well-known examples of such biologically-based linguistic metaphors are FEAR IS
COLD and ANGER IS HEAT metaphors (e.g., to
freeze with terror, to boil with anger); cf. [Lakoff & Johnson 1980,
Apresjan & Apresjan 1993, Kövecses 2000, on the metaphorical
conceptualization of these emotions, Ekman 1984 on their physiological
manifestations]. Recent neuropsychological research allows to expand this list,
as it suggests that feeling “hurt” and feeling empathy indeed activate pain
centers in the brain [McDonald & Leary 2005, Gallese 2001, Singer et al. 2004],
thus providing a biological explanation for the widely spread OFFENCE IS PAIN
and PITY IS PAIN metaphors (cf. to be
hurt, to be wounded, to be injured as expressions of ‘offended’ feeling and
ùåìÿùàÿ æàëîñòü ‘piercing
pity’, áîëüíî çà
êîãî-òî ‘to feel pained for
somebody’ as expressions of ‘pity’).
Likewise, [Calder et al. 2001] suggest that physical distaste, manifested in
actual nausea, and moral repugnance that does not involve actual nausea symptoms,
are nevertheless neurologically very much the same in that they activate the
same neural pathways, thus proving a biological basis for another widely-spread
metaphoric mapping, DISGUST IS FEELING SICK.
The following common tendencies in the organization of emotion clusters have been found:
First of all, both languages show a considerably larger number of emotion terms that denote unpleasant emotions, which is not surprising either biologically or linguistically. Among the biologically and psychologically defined “basic” emotions which presumably carry a survival value, there are four unpleasant ones (fear, anger, sadness, disgust) and only one pleasant (joy). Although there are more pleasant emotions among the non-basic ones (pride, gratitude), unpleasant on the whole outweighs the pleasant (shame, pity, jealousy, envy, resentment). Language, too, is well-known for marking negative and abnormal over positive or normal.
For each of the emotions examined, there are certain gradations within the cluster. Usually, there is a neutral term which denotes a natural degree of emotion in relation to the stimulus: fear, anger, disgust, shame, joy, sadness, pride, pity, even jealousy and their Russian correlates, that do not bear any negative or positive evaluation on the part of the speaker. A degree of emotion which is excessive in regard to the stimulus and therefore inappropriate, or a behavior driven by an excessively strong emotion, or being overly prone to experiencing a certain emotion is usually marked negatively: cowardice (behavior caused by one’s inability to master fear), grumpy, irascible (too prone to anger), uptight (too prone to embarrassment), despondent (too sad for too long a time), bleeding-heart (too prone to pity), etc. Besides, within some clusters, there are terms denoting clinical conditions, marked by prolonged and unmotivated experiencing of a certain emotion: phobia, fright; depression; aversion.
Some emotions are expected to occur in appropriate circumstances and their absence is viewed as a deviation from the social or ethical norm, e.g., pity, shame, gratitude: thus, pitiless, shameless, ungrateful (áåçæàëîñòíûé, áåññòûæèé, áåññòûäíûé, íåáëàãîäàðíûé) are negative terms marking the inability to experience a naturally expected emotion. Interestingly, fear is viewed as an expected response to danger, and its absence (fearless, áåññòðàøíûé) as a deviation from the norm, though in this case the norm is biological, and the deviation from it is not only socially acceptable, but even positively evaluated.
Emotions that are either socially expected or otherwise desirable responses can occur as a result of conscious stimulation; cf. to cheer up, to shame, to move or âåñåëèòü, ñòûäèòü, ðàçæàëîáèòü, which denote a controlled intentional action with the purpose of inducing the respective emotion.
Emotions which are not desirable because they are unpleasant for the experiencer or for their object or have no ethical value, usually occur as responses to unintentional stimuli, since nobody wants to induce them on purpose; cf. to disgust, to sadden, to anger, to irritate, ïå÷àëèòü,ñåðäèòü,ðàçäðàæàòü which refer to unintentional behaviors or even events: You disgust me, Her illness saddened him, He was angered by the result of the election, This noise irritates me, but not *Ïåðåñòàíü âûçûâàòü ó ìåíÿ îòâðàùåíèå ‘Stop disgusting me’[L.L.1] , ??Íå ïå÷àëü ìåíÿ ‘Don’t sadden me’. The idea of unintentional causation is also expressed by adjectives in both languages: creepy, sad, scary, ïðîòèâíûé, ïå÷àëüíûé, ñòðàøíûé, etc.
Emotions whose
primary object is another person, can often be directed at self as well, but
not if they are strong, uncontrollable, involve obligatory behavioral
manifestations or too much of an alienation from the object; thus, one can have
self-pity, self-contempt, self-disgust,
be angry at oneself, or èñïûòûâàòü
ê
ñåáå
æàëîñòü
<ïðåçðåíèå, îòâðàùåíèå>, ñåðäèòüñÿ íà ñåáÿ,
but one cannot have *self-loathing, *rage at oneself, *have compassion for oneself, *be
offended by oneself or *èñïûòûâàòü ê ñåáå ñîñòðàäàíèå <*ãàäëèâîñòü>,*ïðèâîäèòü ñåáÿ â áåøåíñòâî..[L.L.2] Likewise, the object of
such emotions as gratitude, envy,
jealousy, áëàãîäàðíîñòü,ðåâíîñòü,çàâèñòü is always
another person, not self, as they involve a great degree of alienation between
the experiencer and the object.
Strong emotions can be manifested in either biological or near-biological reactions or in uncontrolled behaviors: cf. to shake with fear, to choke with rage, to gasp with anger, to vomit with disgust, to cry with sorrow/pity, to laugh with joy, òðÿñòèñü îò ñòðàõà, çàäûõàòüñÿ îò ÿðîñòè,òîøíèò îò îòâðàùåíèÿ, ïëàêàòü îò îáèäû /æàëîñòè,ñìåÿòüñÿ îò ðàäîñòè (biological reactions) and to flee in terror/panic, to strike in rage, â óæàñå óáåæàòü, â ãíåâå óäàðèòü (uncontrolled behaviors), but not *to flee in apprehension, *to hit in annoyance, *óáåæàòü â îïàñåíèè, *óäàðèòü â äîñàäå. Emotions which involve uncontrolled behaviors usually also involve biological reactions (fury, terror), but the reverse is not true (joy, pity) [cf. Mel’čuk & Wanner 1996 on the linguistic connections between an emotion’s strength and controllability and its likely manifestations].
Strong emotions which do not deprive their experiencer of the ability to reason, such as compassion, gratitude, envy can drive him (her) to a controlled behavioral response: to help smb. out of compassion, hire smb. out of gratitude, badmouth smb. out of envy, ïîìî÷ü êîìó-òî èç æàëîñòè, âçÿòü êîãî-òî íà ðàáîòó èç áëàãîäàðíîñòè,îêëåâåòàòü êîãî-òî èç çàâèñòè, but not *flee out of panic, *kill out of fury.
Along with these similarities, there are also a number of natural differences in the cluster organization in the two languages, with a somewhat different distribution of Russian-to-English discrepancies than it was previously thought. The existing “mismatches” do not necessarily reflect a fundamental difference in the emotional worlds and experiences in the speakers of Russian and English, but can be, to a great extent, accounted for linguistically. The following sources of cross-linguistic disparity in the area of emotion can be tentatively formulated:
The first source is different mapping of linguistic terms onto the same conceptual field, which is a phenomenon naturally found in all domains of language, not only in the sphere of emotion terms. It happens when a specific configuration of meanings is expressed by a single word in language X and by two or more words in language Y or even by some parts of their respective meanings (e.g., the word horror embraces the meanings of the words óæàñ è îòâðàùåíèå, and the word òîñêà – some parts of the meanings of the words yearning, depression and anguish).
The second
source is different display rules: it seems that American English tends to
avoid sending direct negative messages of the kind ‘I did something bad’
(prototypical setting for ‘SHAME’), ‘You made me feel bad’ (prototypical
setting for ‘OFFENCE’), ‘You feel bad’ (prototypical setting for ‘HURT
FEELINGS’), ‘You are in a bad situation’ (prototypical setting for ‘PITY’) and
replaces them with milder ones where possible, whereas there is no such
constraint in Russian. It explains the relative higher frequency of the Russian
terms for ‘pity’, ‘shame’, and ‘offence’, which has led to the inclusion of æàëîñòü ‘pity’, íåëîâêî ‘I feel bad, I feel ashamed; lit.: uncomfortable’, îáèæàòü ‘to offend, to hurt’, îáèæàòüñÿ ‘to feel hurt, offended’ in the list of
Russian ethno-specific key words [Levontina 2004],
[Shmelev 2002], [Levontina & Zalizniak 2001]. On the
whole, Russian discourse
allows one to express negative
feelings in a slightly exaggerated way, as compared to American English, which
welcomes exaggerated expression of positive
feelings (cf. much-discussed de-semanticized use of happy as compared to ñ÷àñòëèâûé), but shuns
the expression of negative feelings.
Thus, it is acceptable in the Russian cultural milieu to tell a person X that the experiencer feels sorry for X, or admit that (s)he feels offended by X, and it is polite to exaggerate one’s feeling of shame before X for insignificant inconveniences caused by the experiencer. The English language, on the other hand, prefers to spare the feelings of both the experiencer and the object of emotion and slightly diminish them, often by using generalized terms like to feel bad in situations potentially embarrassing for either of the communicants; cf. I feel bad for you, I feel for you instead of Ìíå òåáÿ æàëêî ‘I feel pity for you’; I feel bad to bother you instead of Ìíå íåëîâêî Âàñ áåñïîêîèòü ‘I’m ashamed to bother you’, This made me feel bad, I was sad instead of Ìíå áûëî îáèäíî ‘I was offended’, Take it easy instead of Íå îáèæàéñÿ ‘Don’t be offended’.
Below, are some excerpts from the comparison of ‘FEAR’ emotion clusters in Russian and English, from the total of 11 clusters analyzed. Many of the individual emotion terms mentioned above and below have received profound and thorough semantic descriptions in the works of [Iordanskaja 1971, 1984], [Iordanskaja et al. 1996], [Wierzbicka 1999], [Ju. D. Apresjan 2004], [Uryson 2004], [Levontina 2004], [Shmelev 2002], [Levontina & Zalizniak 2001] and other researchers.
‘FEAR’ cluster in Russian and English
Both languages have a concept of “general, neutral” ‘FEAR’, which is an emotional, rational and behavioral response to a potentially dangerous object, event, situation or action; at the prospect of coming into a closer contact with it, the experiencer wants to withdraw.
This type of ‘FEAR’ can be semantically explicated as follows
‘a person X
thinks that a person, event or action Y is dangerous; X wants to avoid Y; X
feels bad’: I’m afraid of this man <of
the exams>; I’m afraid to go into
the woods; I’m scared to go down this
slope; ß áîþñü
ýòîãî
÷åëîâåêà
<ýêçàìåíîâ>; ß áîþñü
õîäèòü
â
ëåñ; Ìíå ñòðàøíî åõàòü ñ ãîðû.
There is also a notion of short-lived “biological” ‘FEAR’, which does not involve any thinking prior to experiencing the emotion; it is the product of a sudden exposure to a frightening object or situation, such as a dog, a stranger, a sudden noise, etc. Semantically, it can be explicated as follows:
‘X suddenly perceives an object Y; X-s body reacts to it as it reacts to danger - by lowered body temperature and heightened blood rate; X might do some involuntary actions as a result, for example, to run away or to freeze; X feels (s)he has experienced something bad’. This type of fear is expressed by several lexical items in English and Russian: to get scared, to get frightened, to get a scare, to be shit-scared, as well as the Russian ïóãàòüñÿ/èñïóãàòüñÿ/ïåðåïóãàòüñÿ.
Both English and
Russian have concepts for a very strong short-lasting
‘FEAR’which can be explicated as
‘X thinks
that a very bad Y might happen or that a very bad and powerful Y might do
something very bad to X; X feels that (s)he cannot do anything to prevent this;
X feels very bad’.
In English,
there is a special word to express this meaning, terror and its derivatives – to
terrify, terrifying, terrified. This kind of ‘FEAR’
involves a very strong physiological and uncontrolled behavioral response,
which is reflected in language, cf. to go
pale with terror, one’s blood turns icy with terror, to freeze/to numb with
terror; to flee in terror. The Russian correlate of this word, óæàñ,
as well as its derivatives, óæàñàòüñÿ/óæàñíóòüñÿ has a wider meaning: it can refer not only
to the feeling of anticipating something very bad, but also to the feeling
of being exposed to something very
bad that has already happened. Thus, it is possible to use this word in both of
the following contexts, where English uses two separate terms: Îí ñ óæàñîì ñìîòðåë íà ïðèáëèæàâøèõñÿ áàíäèòîâ ‘He was looking at the approaching gangsters
in terror’ and Îí ñ óæàñîì ñìîòðåë íà îáåçîáðàæåííîå òåëî ‘He
was looking at the mutilated body in horror’. In the first usage, it is very
much like terror; cf. çàñòûòü <ïîáåëåòü> îò óæàñà, áûòü ïàðàëèçîâàííûì óæàñîì, óáåæàòü â óæàñå ‘to freeze with terror, to be paralyzed by
terror, to go pale with terror, to flee in terror’.
In the
second usage, it is different from terror
and closer to horror, though it
lacks the ‘disgust’ component of horror.
The perfective verb form óæàñíóòüñÿ, derived from óæàñ, can only refer to the feeling that
occurs after something bad has happened, not prior to it. The imperfective verb form óæàñàòüñÿ is also used to refer to something that
has already happened, only it describes the verbal behavior of a person: Îí äîëãî óæàñàëñÿ ìîåìó ðàññêàçó ‘lit: He for a long time was being
terrified by my story’ means ‘For a while, he was expressing his horror at what
I had told’.
Horror is an emotion which combines the elements of ‘FEAR’ and ‘DISGUST’; it is a borderline emotion, a fact which is manifested even in its metaphorical conceptualization. While horror produces some typical terror-like reactions, it also involves some disgust-type reactions; cf. horror iced <curdled> one’s blood; to shrink in horror, but also to vomit in horror (one cannot vomit in terror or in óæàñ). Horror is an example of removing barriers between emotion clusters, which is a very typical phenomenon for English. Thus, where in English we find horror, in Russian we may well find óæàñ è îòâðàùåíèå ‘terror and disgust’, or óæàñ, ñìåøàííûé ñ îòâðàùåíèåì ‘terror mixed with disgust’ to describe this particular brand of feeling. However, interestingly, though both ‘strong fear’ and ‘disgust’ components seem to be present in horror, their sum does not equal its meaning. In a very subtle description of horror [Solomon 2004] points out an important component of horror that seems to be absent in either of these two emotions: the component of breaking the norm, of shock from discovering, instead of something normal and familiar, something monstrous and ghastly.
Both languages have singled out a kind of religious ‘FEAR’ that is inspired by very powerful objects and forces like God or nature, though both for Russian and English it is a more marginal concept; thus, lexical items expressing it are less frequently used, and belong to a literary, rather than colloquial register.
This type of ‘FEAR’ is mixed with great respect and admiration, and the component of ‘FEAR’ in it is not enough to render the resulting feeling unpleasant. Y is not perceived as dangerous or potentially harmful; on the contrary, it is viewed as exceedingly good; however, Y’s omnipotence as compared to the experiencer’s relative weakness accounts for the ‘FEAR’-component. Semantically, it can be explicated as follows:
‘X thinks that Y is very powerful and very good; X feels something very good and very strong for Y; X feels that Y can do everything; X feels small and insignificant in the presence of Y; X cannot do anything in the presence of Y’.
In English, this
type of fear is more pronounced: the
word awe and its derivatives (awesome, awed) refer to this mixed type
of feeling, whereas in order to express
this combined meaning the Russian language would resort to using a phrase áëàãîãîâåéíûé
óæàñ
‘lit: awesome terror’, or metaphorical expressions òðåïåò, òðåïåòàòü ‘lit:
quaking, to quake’. Awe
does not contain ‘FEAR’ and ‘ADMIRATION’ in equal proportions, which is
why áëàãîãîâåéíûé <ñâÿùåííûé> óæàñ is not an exact correlate; in
awe, the measure of the good emotion,
admiration, is stronger than that of the scary emotion; so, on the whole, it is
perceived as a positive emotion rather than negative.
In contrast
to this reverent, religious-like feeling, there is a totally rational type of ‘FEAR’
which involves little, if any, emotional components and implies a mostly
rational appraisal of a certain object or situation as dangerous and, as a
result, a controlled behavior in the form of consciously avoiding it:
‘X thinks
that Y is dangerous; X prefers to avoid Y’.
This type
of ‘FEAR’ is expressed by apprehensive and
its derivatives in English and îïàñàòüñÿ and
its derivatives in Russian: Apprehensive
about the side effects of anti-depressants, he opted out of pharmacotherapy;
Îïàñàÿñü ïîáî÷íûõ ýôôåêòîâ àíòèäåïðåññàíòîâ,
îí îòêàçàëñÿ îò ìåäèêàìåíòîçíîãî ëå÷åíèÿ.
An absolute
opposite to the rational ‘FEAR’ are panic and freaking out, as well as the Russian ïàíèêà. This type of ‘FEAR’
implies complete loss of rational control over emotions and, in the case of panic and ïàíèêà, uncontrolled behavioral reactions;
unlike all other types of ‘FEAR’,
this one can characterize the psychotic behavior of large groups of people,
even crowds; cf. the psychological term crowd
panic.
Since ‘FEAR’ involves behavioral responses, its appraisal is
partly triggered by social and ethical norms. Both languages contain a concept
of “bad, unethical” ‘FEAR’ or,
rather, unethical behavior in the situation when a person experiences fear. The
situations themselves might differ with time, place and culture, but there are
always some which require bravery, and the failure to live up to the required
expectations results in negative ethical evaluation of the person and his (her)
behavior. This type of ‘FEAR’ can be
explicated as
‘X feels
that Y is dangerous; X wants to avoid Y; X tries to avoid Y; the speaker thinks
avoiding Y is bad’.
This
type of behavior and type of personality associated with it is expressed by the
English to get cold feet, coward,
cowardly, chicken and the Russian (ñ)òðóñèòü and (ñ)äðåéôèòü , where the imperfective form implies reluctance to
do something and the perfective form – a complete withdrawal from the
situation.
Characteristically,
both languages employ the same metaphorical means to describe this cowardly behavior
in a derogatory way, which are based on one of the rarer symptoms of fear – involuntary
defecation; cf. to poop out, to crap out
or the Russian expression íàëîæèòü â øòàíû which all mean ‘X didn’t do something because of
fear; the speaker thinks this is very bad’ [cf. Dobrovol’skij 1996 on this
expression in Russian and German]. Another way of carrying negative evaluation
metaphorically which is often used in the field of emotions is likening the
experiencer’s behavior to that of an animal; cf. the expression with a similar
meaning to have one’s tail between one’s
legs or its Russian equivalent ïîäæàòü õâîñò.
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[1] This paper was written with the financial support of the grant for senior regional fellows 2007-2008, of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard, as well as partial financial support of the following grants: RF President grant for the leading scientific schools NSH-56.11.2006.6, RHSF N06-04-00289a for «Developing a word list and samples for an active dictionary of Russian», RHSF 07-04-00-202a for “System-forming meanings of Russian Language”, grant of the Program for Fundamental research of the Department of Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences «Russian culture in world history».